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Abstract: I describe and evaluate Harald Wohlrapp’s proposal in The Concept of Argument that we should see
reasonable argumentation as guided by the “principle of transsubjectivity ... that, beginning with my subjectivity, I
put my actual ego up for consideration as well as heighten and transcend it by seeking to participate in a general
human potential, which is only attainable by recognizing the subjectivity of the Other”, and thus as having a quasireligious meaning.
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1. Introduction
In the last chapter of The Concept of Argument (2008/2014), Harald Wohlrapp proposes that we
see reasonable argumentation as guided by what he calls “the principle of transsubjectivity”. To
see argumentation in this way, he argues, is to find in it a quasi-religious meaning. The faith in
human reason embodied in reasonable argumentation, the faith that by reasoning together we
will work out how to do things in the right way, is a secular version of a religious faith in an
ultimate union with God. “... Argumentative speech,” he writes, “... has a transcendent core. It
expresses a strong, quasi-religious belief in humanity’s spiritual and ethical potential”
(Wohlrapp, 2008/2014, p. 304).
In what follows, I propose first of all to make this point of view understandable. To do so
requires making clear Wohlrapp’s key concepts of framing, argumentation, subjectivity,
reasonable argumentation, and the principle of transsubjectivity. With these concepts in place,
we can then appreciate how reasonable discussants can be seen as trying to transcend their
subjectivity, and so how argumentative speech can be seen as having a transcendent core and as
reflecting a quasi-religious faith in human reason.
Having clarified Wohlrapp’s proposal in this way, I shall make some brief evaluative
remarks about it.
2. Framing
To see reasonable argumentation as guided by the principle of transsubjectivity is a kind of
framing. It is not an additional characteristic of argumentation, but a way of seeing it. Framing as
Wohlrapp understands it is a ubiquitous phenomenon of human subjectivity, one of which we are
usually unconscious. We see B as A, for a host of different values of the variables ‘B’ and ‘A’.
Generally, we take ourselves to be seeing B as it really is, not realizing that we are unconsciously
framing it in a certain way. For example, we might see a car that we own as a status symbol, as a
private space, or just as a means of transportation (Wohlrapp, 2008/2014, pp. 177-178)–without
being fully conscious of how we are framing it and how it might be framed differently. In
general, the way we frame issues and phenomena is not a conscious decision on our part. Thus
Bondy, P., & Benacquista, L. (Eds.). Argumentation, Objectivity, and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International
Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 18-21 May 2016. Windsor, ON: OSSA,
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there is something unusual in Wohlrapp’s proposal that we frame reasonable argumentation in a
certain way. Framing B as A is not usually a deliberate, conscious decision taken as the result of
being convinced by an argument for doing so. But perhaps Wohlrapp’s proposal can be
construed as a proposal to recognize explicitly a way of seeing reasonable argumentation that is
already implicit to some extent in those who practice it and are committed to it.
Wohlrapp’s proposal to frame reasonable argumentation as guided by the principle of
transsubjectivity is supposed to be compatible with different theories of argumentation using
different sets of concepts and principles, not just with the complex theoretical construction of his
book. Nevertheless his proposal depends on certain features of his understanding of what
constitutes reasonable argumentation. It is therefore compatible only with ways of understanding
argumentation that share those features.
3. Argumentation
To begin with, we need to be aware that Wohlrapp uses the word ‘argumentation’ as a name for
the practice in which dialogue partners discuss a thesis with a view to determining whether it is
suitable as what he calls a “new orientation” (Wohlrapp, 2008/2014, pp. lix, 132, 270), i.e., as a
“theory that symbolically represents practically relevant distinctions, relationships, and
regularities” (p. 108). In his book, he uses four main examples of such “argumentation”:
•
•
•
•

the case made by Cristóbal Colón (Christopher Columbus) in 1492 for
financing his voyage across the Atlantic that led to the European discovery of
the New World,
the debate in the French parliament in 1792 and 1793 that led to the decision
to execute the former king (Louis XVI) and thus complete the transition from
a monarchy to a republic,
the controversy over the supposed heat substance phlogiston at the beginning
of the rise of modern chemistry in the 18th century, and
the contemporary debate over genetic modification in food production and in
medicine.

A contemporary example in Canada is the public discussion of how the law banning assisted
suicide should be amended so as to accommodate the Supreme Court’s decision in February
2015 that an absolute ban is unconstitutional.
Argumentative discussions like the five just mentioned concern issues about which the
participants do not yet have knowledge or access to knowledge, but cannot rely on mere
subjective opinion. The issues are serious, and participants who are being reasonable put their
trust in the back and forth of claims, justifications and criticisms as the best way to come to a
conclusion that is suitable as a new orientation.
4. Subjectivity
A second precondition for Wohlrapp’s proposal is an acknowledgement of the subjectivity that
reasonable argumentation is to be seen as trying to transcend. For an adequate theory of
argumentation, Wohlrapp (2008/2014) holds, one needs a richer understanding of what it is to be
a subject than either the rhetorical notion of an audience to be persuaded or the dialectical notion
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of an interlocutor who gives or withholds assent. The richer understanding is needed because
participants in argumentative discussion often have deep commitments to their positions,
commitments that reflect the way of understanding the world on which they base their actions.
Conflicts between these ways of understanding need to be externalized and dealt with through
discussion.
To be subjective in the sense Wohlrapp (2008/2014) intends is to take one’s own
opinions to be correct and one’s own desires to be deserving of satisfaction. More fundamentally,
it involves living within the way one sees issues and states of affairs–ways of seeing of which
one is typically unaware and that taken together constitute a more or less coherent world-view.
Every human being is subjective in this sense, and cannot escape being so. None of us can
acquire a “God’s eye view” in which we see the world sub specie aeternitatis, viewing it from
nowhere. The sense in which we transcend our subjectivity in reasonable argumentation is thus
not a matter of somehow becoming objective. No human being is ever objective in the sense of
lacking a personal, situated way of seeing things.
5. Reasonable argumentation
A third pre-condition is acceptance of something like Wohlrapp’s account of what it is to be
reasonable in argumentation. He takes pains to distinguish what he has in mind from standard
accounts of what he calls by contrast “rational argumentation” (Wohlrapp, 2008/2014, p. 394).
So-called “rational argumentation” is confined to logical inferences from clear premisses,
calculations of probability, and exercises of instrumental rationality. Such a restricted normative
framework ignores the dynamic and subjective dimensions of discussion of theses advanced to
fill a gap in the theories on which we rely to make our way in the world. When there is this sort
of gap, we often lack the precise and stable concepts required for logical inference, the factual
knowledge needed to calculate probabilities, and the agreement on goals needed to apply canons
of instrumental rationality. Further, we are subjective, in the sense of being personally engaged
with the issue at hand, with more or less strong commitments. So-called “rational
argumentation” ignores this subjective dimension and thus is unduly restricted. Realism requires
that we incorporate subjectivity in our account of reasonable argumentation.
Without further qualification, however, incorporating subjectivity can license oratorical
persuasiveness as the supreme canon of reasonable argumentation. Wohlrapp (2008/2014) avoids
this unpalatable consequence by rejecting the idea that the goal of participation in argumentation
is to persuade the others to accept one’s position. Rather, the goal is to determine jointly whether
a thesis is suitable as a new orientation. Consider (my example) the individuals and organizations
that have put forward a “vulnerable persons standard” as a means of protecting the lives of
vulnerable persons who may experience coercion and abuse once physician-assisted death
becomes legal in Canada (Vulnerable Persons, n.d.). Their standard is not just an expression of
their personal opinion. They propose it as a set of safeguards of vulnerable persons to be
incorporated in federal legislation regulating physician-assisted death. By publishing their
proposal in a public forum, and by providing justifications for the safeguards that they propose,
they invite commentary and implicitly indicate a readiness to respond to objections and
criticisms. They have externalized as an object to be considered by others their framing of
physician-assisted death as a threat to the lives of vulnerable persons. They thus open themselves
up to reconsideration of their proposal in the light of objections, a reconsideration that may
involve a change in their own subjectivity, in how they see themselves and how they see the
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world. Likewise, those who frame physician-assisted death as a blessed relief for intolerable and
irremediable suffering may be led to change their views of themselves and of the world by
considering seriously the proposed vulnerable persons standard and the arguments for it.
Reasonable argumentation is thus both subjective and dynamic. It requires treating the
Other with whom one discusses a proposed thesis as an equal. If a thesis is up for discussion, it is
unreasonable for its proponent to decline to provide a justification. If an objection is raised, it is
unreasonable to ignore it. Such reactions may reflect self-confidence about the rightness of one’s
own position or the arrogance of holding a position of power. Whatever their cause, they
constitute a failure to recognize as an equal partner the Other who requests a justification or
raises an objection. In contrast, the recognition of the Other that reasonableness requires puts
one’s own subjectivity up for consideration. One risks. And why? To see whether a thesis that
has been advanced is suitable as a new orientation. The Other with whom one is in dialogue is a
source of information, opinions and ways of seeing that one does not have oneself and that can
help in getting to a conclusion that is supported by an adequate justification with an adequate
response to objections and criticisms.
6. Transsubjectivity
To sum up, Wohlrapp’s (2008/2014) proposal to see reasonable argumentation as guided by the
principle of transsubjectivity rests on the following three assumptions about argumentation:
• Argumentation is to be understood as a practice of investigating in dialogue
whether a thesis is a suitable as a new orientation in an area where we do not
have knowledge.
• In this practice, the subjectivity of the participants is engaged, not just in terms
of the distinctive opinions and knowledge that each brings to the discussion, but
also in their way of seeing things and their emotional commitments.
• Reasonable argumentation requires that we recognize our dialogue partners as
equals, in the sense that we satisfy their requests for justification and respond to
their objections and criticisms, thus opening ourselves to changes in our position
and in the way we see things, i.e., to changes in our subjectivity.
What then is the principle of transsubjectivity that we are invited to see as guiding
reasonable argumentation as so understood? Wohlrapp takes the notion of such a principle from
his teacher Paul Lorenzen, who coined the word ‘transsubjectivity’ as an abbreviation for
‘transcendence of subjectivity’ (Lorenzen, 1969, p. 82). In his John Locke lectures at the
University of Oxford in 1967-68, Lorenzen lays down the principle “Let us transcend our
subjectivity!” as the fundamental principle of reason and morality: He explains the prescribed
transcendence as
still subjectivity, but a subjectivity which is aware of its own limits–and tries to
overcome them. Transsubjectivity is not a fact, but it is not a postulate either.
Transsubjectivity is simply a term characterizing that activity in which we are
always already involved if we begin to reason at all. (Lorenzen, 1969, p. 82)
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To be subjective, for Lorenzen, is to be unwilling to surrender one’s own opinions. To be
transsubjective is not to cease to be a subject, which is impossible. Rather, it is to try to
overcome the limitations of one’s opinions.
Wohlrapp’s conception of transsubjectivity deepens and socializes Lorenzen’s idea.
Wohlrapp articulates as a contrast concept what he calls “the principle of subjectivity”
(Wohlrapp, 2008/2014, pp. 397-398), according to which we organize things so as to control the
conditions under which we live and thus make it possible to act as we like. He sees human
beings in the advanced industrial economies as living by this principle, with a self-confidence
that is shaken only by such things as illness and death. This self-confidence is an illusion.
Secular people in the modern world have lost the sense of trust and the level of meaning
formerly provided by religion. As Wohlrapp (2008/2014) puts it, “mere subjective selfdetermination devours meaning” [translation modified] (p. 398). But trust is still required. “Selfdetermination without trust is barren and empty” (Wohlrapp, 2008/2014, p. 398).
The contrasting transsubjectivity that Wohlrapp finds in reasonable argumentation is not
mere intersubjective agreement. It is
a heightening of subjectivity aimed at the potential for being compatible with the
subjectivity of the Other.... beginning with my subjectivity, I put my actual ego up
for consideration as well as heighten and transcend it by seeking to participate in a
general human potential, which is only attainable by recognizing the subjectivity
of the Other. (Wholrapp, 2008/2014, p. 401)
By engaging in reasonable argumentation, we manifest a trust that we will work out together a
suitable new orientation, one that transcends the limited basis from which each of us individually
begins.
7. Religion
What, we might wonder, does all this have to do with religion? We can perhaps appreciate that in
reasoning together we manifest a trust in the power of reason that is akin to the trust of a
traditional religious believer in the providence of a loving God, and we aim for a transcendence
of our subjectivity that is a horizontal analogue of the vertical transcendence postulated by
theism. In each case, there is something beyond me. But the trust and transcendence in
reasonable argumentation may hardly seem religious.
Whether it is in fact religious, or quasi-religious, depends of course on what we mean by
religion. Wohlrapp articulates his thinking on this question in the last section of his book and at
greater length in an article entitled “Eine pragmatische Definition der Religion” (“A pragmatic
definition of religion”, Wohlrapp, 2010). He notes that religions have a practical side and a
theoretical side–on the practical side such things as prayers and sacrifices, on the theoretical side
texts about the holy, about gods, about God. To treat the messages of the theoretical side as
cognitive claims to be adjudicated by philosophical argument is to miss what is central to
religion. What is really important, from the pragmatic point of view that Wohlrapp shares with
Peirce, is religious practice: prayers, worship, observance of prescribed rules. If one gets
accustomed to such a practice, Wohlrapp (2014/2008) thinks, one may come to “the substance of
religion ... the encompassing trust that the world is good and right” (p. 414).
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Wohlrapp sketches the development of this trust. A child is born with a “basic trust” that
loving parenting strengthens into a sense that the world is good and right. A religious community
heightens this “natural religiosity” into true religious consciousness.
In the development of our species, however, advances in technical knowledge have made
outmoded the archaic belief that the forces of nature are divine. The Enlightenment replaced the
promise of salvation with a belief in progress, which however the horrors of the 20th century
have subsequently undermined. We are left with a tension between the enlightened secular part
of humanity and the believers in traditional religion who are not touched by enlightenment. In
reasonable argumentation, however, enlightened people can find a transcendent meaning, a sense
that things are good and right, through their trust in human reason–a trust analogous to the trust
that is the substance of religion.
In a coda to his article on the definition of religion, Wohlrapp (2010) asserts that the
alpha and omega of religion is the posture or operation of distancing: remaining aware that one’s
consciousness is provisional and always to be renewed and improved (p. 407). We find this
distancing, he holds, in the transcendent engagement with others in the practice of reasonable
argumentation guided by the principle of transsubjectivity. Reasonable argumentation thus has a
quasi-religious meaning.
8. Evaluative remarks
We should note first that Wohlrapp has quite legitimately singled out for theoretical attention
under the name ‘argumentation’ an important human practice, one that investigators of
argumentation often lump indiscriminately with less significant activities. He is right to note the
way that our subjectivity is engaged when we reason together about important issues that our
present knowledge cannot settle. He rightly notes the combination of distancing and commitment
in the participants in such discussions. Each of us has a commitment to our position, but by
expressing it publicly and providing a justification we invite criticisms and requests for further
justification, hoping that the contributions of others will help us get to a conclusion on which we
can justifiably rely. Wohlrapp is thus right to see in the practice of argumentation an implicit
trust in the power of human reason. We can indeed see reasonable argumentation as guided by
the principle that we ought to transcend our subjectivity, in the sense of making our subjectivity
compatible with the subjectivity of others. It is no criticism of these claims to note that reality
falls far short of the ideal, that argumentation in our political life and in social media is full for
example of irrelevant personal attacks.
But does the trust in human reason implicit in reasonable argumentation really give it
religious meaning? Not in the full sense, I would argue. All religions hold out a promise of
personal salvation, whether in the release from suffering available to those who follow the
Eightfold Way of atheistic Buddhism or the ultimate union with God promised by theistic and
polytheistic religions like Judaism, Christianity, Islam and Hinduism. Further, they have rituals
to mark, and give significance to, the birth, maturation, marriage and death of individual
adherents. There is nothing like this in the trust in human reason implicit in reasonable
argumentation. Nor is it reasonable to expect it. Argumentation is a practice that helps us to
make our way in the world. To seek in it a secular counterpart to the meaning provided by
religion is both to expect too much of argumentation and to grant too little to religion.
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9. Summary
In The Concept of Argument (2008/2014) Harald Wohlrapp proposes that we see reasonable
argumentation as guided by what he calls “the principle of transsubjectivity” and thus as having
a quasi-religious meaning. To make this proposal understandable, I have explained Wohlrapp’s
conceptions of framing, argumentation, subjectivity, reasonable argumentation, transsubjectivity
and religion. While reasonable argumentation does conform to the imperative to transcend our
subjectivity that Wohlrapp sees in it, it is an exaggeration to describe as religious its implicit
trust in the power of human reason.
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